We are thrilled to have Dr. Gerald Thomas leading a Daily Study Group on the field theory of games starting October 2, 2023.
Join Dr. Thomas and a group of fellow learners to explore a computational approach to economics and business using the field theory of games. See how game theory can be extended with ideas from geometry, physics and engineering to include new dynamics. Discussions will include applied examples from economics to give students insight into the ways a systems engineering approach can be used to understand how decisions are made.
No prior knowledge of game theory or Wolfram Language is assumed, so a brief introduction to both topics will be provided.
Hi all. Don’t all real games permanently play against/with nature as a player? Maybe that’s the problem with climate change/economics that these players are considered isolated from reality… maxwell’s demon is the house! Is that a branch of game theory, games with a sort of “house player” ?
As with most things, you have to decide what to model and what not to model in a given situation. In brief, yes, it is possible to model dynamics where the choice of strategies available to one player (a “house” player in the context of common games of chance as you might put it) are completely different than the strategies available to other players. The central idea is that each “player” needs various strategy options and that each player has a view on what utility (or payoff) they gain given all participants’ choice of strategies.
I am trying to follow (more slowly) the example used in Monday’s class. But although the notebook DPT-Toolkit.nb worked in class, I can’t open it with my Mathematica 12.0. Is there another way of opening this notebook file? “Open with…” doesn’t really suggest anything.
If there is one player, it is still possible to model the expected payoff given that player’s utility function and any random events that may occur as part of the game. However, most of what is usually called game theory has to do with situations in which more than one agent is making decisions. The thing that makes something like solitaire complicated is not that there is more than one agent involved, it’s that the decision tree at each step (in the extensive form of the game) has many branches.
Yes, based on survey responses from day 1, it seems the audience is more advanced in Wolfram Language than the original plan for day 2 would have assumed. The Wolfram U team will get the new day 2 notebook cleaned up and change the handouts folder.
General question. At the end of class today Prof. Thomas briefly mentioned that Field Theory of Games can be used in regards to electromagnetic fields in terms of payoffs.
I was wondering where I can find more info on that?
Also I was wondering if Field Theory of Games has been applied to the electromagnetic fields of the human physiology in anyway?
More generally for any other processes in the body, psychological processes, or in some general way of connecting psychological processes to a psychological data?
Have you thought about Field Theory of Games application with LLM’s or visa versa?
Does the constraint of using the normalized form put one at a disadvantage since there is no way (as far as I can tell) to react to surprises (as opposed to anticipated moves). Of course, using a move that wasn’t already in the game is cheating in most circumstances, but in other circumstances, that’s considered to be innovation.
While the analysis shown in the study group uses the normal form of a game, it is often practically possible to turn the extensive form into normal form. You can see this outside reference for more on representing games in different forms: Link . As you point out, the model has to contain all possible moves to lead to correct conclusions. In either extensive form or normal form, if the person doing the modeling hasn’t included a relevant possibility, then the conclusions won’t be right. As long as you can assign a utility value to strategies that might be considered cheating in the colloquial sense of the word, they can be included as just another strategy available as a choice to agents.
Is that a branch of game theory, games with a sort of “house player” ?