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[WSG67] Daily Study Group: Decision Process Theory

Posted 1 month ago
POSTED BY: Gerald Thomas
11 Replies

I don't know what the problem was where I was getting different results when I ran the code myself, but I suspect there was some code before it that I didn't run that was relevant, because when I went back and tried it again, I am getting the same results.

POSTED BY: Kari Grafton

Yes, that happens to me when i forget to run some of the preliminary code.

POSTED BY: Gerald Thomas
Posted 10 days ago

Is it fair to say that the solutions found in field theory of games are numerical solutions to a closed-form expression for iterative play of classical game theory? At least, as shown through lesson 8?

POSTED BY: Neil Tice

If I understand your question, the answer is yes. The Field Theory of Games is dealing with iterative games, those played again and again.

POSTED BY: Gerald Thomas
Posted 11 days ago

Yes, my code was meant to be an example of my reverse polish intuition from HP-45 days. Is this the general concept with v being the more valuable (3/4 for Blue-Major in your case)?

TableForm[{{1, 1 - v}, {v, 1}}, 
 TableHeadings -> {{Subscript[m, B], Subscript[M, B]}, {Subscript[m, 
    R], Subscript[M, R]}}]

Given a quadratic determinant, that suggests a quadrant of the unit circle as trade-off. Clearly, I am looking for an idiot’s guide to payoff matrices and an explanation of why the WL MatrixGamePayoff tableau looks so different.

POSTED BY: David Barnes

You have the general concept. Note your matrix has only one variable, and in general there are four variables.

POSTED BY: Gerald Thomas
Posted 12 days ago

Last century, before you provided such nifty code, I would have looked at attackDefense this way,

Block[{b, r, p, s}, b = {{4, 1}, {3, 4}}; r = -Transpose@b;
 p[x_] := {x[[1, 2]]/Det[x], x[[2, 1]]/Det[x]};
 {s = p[#] & /@ {b, r}, Norm /@ Normalize /@ s} // Column
 ]

But I admit that I never understood the input. For example, what does the 3 mean? Is that blue’s value for thing 1 and Red’s value for thing 2? I got your books but I remain confused about the payoff versus the view, etc.

POSTED BY: David Barnes

I see what you are doing but it doesn't lead to the optimal game solution. Your question about what does "3" mean is relevant. In this example, taken from Rand corporation in the 50's, one installation is three times more valuable than the other. Suppose the minor installation has a value 1. If both survive, blue gets a value 4. If blue defends the major installation and red attacks the minor, blue gets 3. If blue defends the minor installation and red attacks the major, blue gets 1. Hence the values for the payoff matrix with rows labeled "minor" and "major" defense. And columns labeled "minor" and "major" attack.

POSTED BY: Gerald Thomas

I am not familiar with it, but thank you for the link. It appears related to the work people do in Systems Dynamics, though from the web site the underlying mathematics is not clear. That it draws from science is definitely a connection.

POSTED BY: Gerald Thomas

Thank you for the reply.

The way I saw it first was through a book called Factory Physics by Wallace J. Hopp, Ph.D. Mark L. Spearman, PhD, https://factoryphysics.com/books/factory-physics-3rd-edition/. Mark Spearman founded the Ops Science Institute to help push this out into the manufacturing world. It seems to me that there must be a connection. There are many ways to approach what takes place in making a decision, Including TRIZ (or SIT), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systematicinventivethinking.

POSTED BY: Deuard Worthen

How does this relate to Operation Science: https://opscience.org/

POSTED BY: Deuard Worthen
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