Group Abstract Group Abstract

Message Boards Message Boards

0
|
90 Views
|
0 Replies
|
0 Total Likes
View groups...
Share
Share this post:
GROUPS:

Proof-of-work protocol with two hash conditions: attack complexity and possible improvements

Posted 20 hours ago

Consider the Proof-of-Work mechanism used for block validation in a distributed system. In the general setting, we are given two hash functions

$$ H1, H2 : A \times B \rightarrow {0, 1, \ldots, 2^{256} - 1} $$

where $A = B = \{0,1\}^{512}$.

To verify a block, the following cryptographic protocol is executed:

  1. The validator publishes values $a \in A$ and $L \in \mathbb{N}$.
  2. To prove correctness of the block, a participant must provide $b \in B$ such that $$ H1(a, b) < L, \quad H2(a, b) < L $$ where $$ H1(a, b) = \mathrm{SHA\text{-}256}(a \oplus b), \qquad H2(a, b) = \mathrm{SHA\text{-}256}((a \oplus b) \cdot 2025 + 1). $$
  3. The validator checks the correctness of these computations.

Questions:

  1. Are there any methods to find y for a fixed L that are faster than brute-force?
  2. What protocol improvements are known in the literature for increasing the attack complexity in this context? More generally, how could the presented protocol be modified to make such attacks more difficult?
POSTED BY: Alex Ruben
Reply to this discussion
Community posts can be styled and formatted using the Markdown syntax.
Reply Preview
Attachments
Remove
or Discard